Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/689773
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 99-139
• 关键词: Boston mechanism; EFFICIENCY; university; STABILITY; match

摘要

Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitioned from a sequential to a parallel mechanism to make their admissions decisions. In this study, we characterize a parametric family of application-rejection assignment mechanisms, including the sequential, deferred acceptance, and parallel mechanisms in a nested framework. We show that all of the provinces that have abandoned the sequential mechanism have moved toward less manipulable and more stable mechanisms. We also show that existing empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical predictions.