Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashlagi, Itai; Kanoria, Yash; Leshno, Jacob D.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/689869
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 69-98
• 关键词: marriage problem; STABILITY; incentives; INDIA; core

摘要

We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. Second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching markets are extremely competitive. Each agent on the short side of the market is matched with one of his top choices, and each agent on the long side either is unmatched or does almost no better than being matched with a random partner. Our results suggest that any matching market is likely to have a small core, explaining why small cores are empirically ubiquitous.