Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Verdier, Thierry
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago; Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/693038
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1245-1305
• 关键词: research-and-development; DRUG PRICES; INNOVATION; redistribution; INVESTMENT; DEMOCRACY; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country's contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countries. Some countries become technology leaders and opt for a type of cutthroat capitalism with greater inequality and innovations, while others free ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more cuddly form of capitalism with greater social insurance for entrepreneurs.