ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS - AN EXAMINATION OF JUNK-BOND ISSUERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ASQUITH, P; GERTNER, R; SCHARFSTEIN, D
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.2307/2118416
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 625-658
• 关键词: agency costs; bankruptcy; FIRMS; RESTRUCTURINGS; reorganization; OWNERSHIP; priority; default; claims

摘要

This paper analyzes the ways in which financially distressed firms try to avoid bankruptcy through public and private debt restructurings, asset sales, mergers, and capital expenditure reductions. Our main finding is that a firm's debt structure affects the way financially distressed firms restructure. The combination of secured private debt and numerous public debt issues seems to impede out-of-court restructurings and increases the probability of a Chapter 11 filing. In addition, we find that, while asset sales are a way of avoiding Chapter 11, they are limited by industry factors: firms in distressed and highly leveraged industries are less prone to sell assets.