Taxation and the Allocation of Talent

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lockwood, Benjamin B.; Nathanson, Charles G.; Weyl, E. Glen
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University; Microsoft; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/693393
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1635-1682
• 关键词: marginal tax rates; income taxation; elasticities; cost; CEOS

摘要

Taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a calling. Estimates from the literature suggest that high-paying professions have negative externalities, whereas low-paying professions have positive externalities. A calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle-class incomes and positive rates on the rich. The welfare gains from implementing such a policy are small and are dwarfed by the gains from profession-specific taxes and subsidies. These results depend crucially on externality estimates and labor substitution patterns across professions, both of which are very uncertain given existing empirical evidence.