Do doctors practice defensive medicine?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kessler, D; McClellan, M
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.2307/2946682
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 353-390
• 关键词: MALPRACTICE INSURANCE; tort reforms; liability; LAW

摘要

''Defensive medicine'' is a potentially serious social problem: if fear of liability drives health care providers to administer treatments that do not have worthwhile medical benefits, then the current liability system may generate inefficiencies much larger than the costs of compensating malpractice claimants. To obtain direct empirical evidence on this question, we analyze the effects of malpractice liability reforms using data on all elderly Medicare beneficiaries treated fbr serious heart disease in 1984, 1987, and 1990. We find that malpractice reforms that directly reduce provider liability pressure lead to reductions of 5 to 9 percent in medical expenditures without substantial effects on mortality or medical complications. We conclude that liability reforms can reduce defensive medical practices.