Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fan, Ying; Kuehn, Kai-Uwe; Lafontaine, Francine
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/694566
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2082-2125
• 关键词: competitive-equilibrium; EXISTENCE; systems; MODEL; TRADE

摘要

Financial constraints are considered an important impediment to growth for small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically the relationship between the financial constraints of agents and the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in an area is associated with a delay in chains' entry into franchising by 0.33 year on average, or 10 percent of the average waiting time, and a reduction in chain growth and hence a reduction in franchised chain employment of about 9 percent.