Emotions and Political Unrest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido
• 署名单位: University of Turin; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/691700
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 903-946
• 关键词: reference points; CONTRACTS; determinants; incentives; fairness; deficits; VALUES

摘要

How does political unrest influence public policy? We assume that protests are an emotional reaction to unfair treatment. Individuals have a consistent view of fairness that internalizes government constraints. Individuals accept lower welfare if the government is more constrained. This resignation effect induces a benevolent government to delay unpleasant choices and accumulate public debt to mitigate social unrest. More radical and homogeneous groups are more prone to unrest and hence more influential. Even if the government is benevolent and all groups are identical in their propensity to riot, equilibrium policy can be distorted. The evidence is consistent with these implications.