Cooperation in WTO's Tariff Waters?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nicita, Alessandro; Olarreaga, Marcelo; Silva, Peri
• 署名单位: University of Geneva; University of Geneva; Kansas State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/697085
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1302-1338
• 关键词: instrumental variable estimation; Preferential trade agreements; POLICY UNCERTAINTY THEORY; LIBERALIZATION; Retaliation; CONTRACTS; models; TALKS; caps; wars

摘要

This paper examines the extent to which tariff cooperation is observed among World Trade Organization members. With the help of a simple political economy model, we show that tariffs are positively correlated with the importer's market power when they are set noncooperatively but negatively correlated when set cooperatively. We use this prediction to empirically identify the extent of cooperation in the WTO and find that more than three-quarters of WTO members' tariffs are set noncooperatively.