The firm as a dedicated hierarchy: A theory of the origins and growth of firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rajan, RG; Zingales, L
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/00335530152466241
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 805-851
• 关键词: costs; incentives; OWNERSHIP; authority; workers; AGENCY; trust

摘要

In the formative stages of their businesses, entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents. We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem determines the organization's internal structure, growth, and its eventual size. Large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical-capital-intensive industries, and will have seniority-based promotion policies. By contrast, flat hierarchies will prevail in human-capital-intensive industries and will have up-or-out promotion systems, Furthermore, flat hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies. The model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets.