The power of suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Madrian, BC; Shea, DF
署名单位：
University of Chicago
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.1162/003355301753265543
发表日期：
2001
页码：
1149-1187
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the impact of automatic enrollment on 401(k) savings behavior. We have two key findings. First, 401(k) participation is significantly higher under automatic enrollment. Second, a substantial fraction of 401(k) participants hired under automatic enrollment retain both the default contribution rate and fund allocation even though few employees hired before automatic enrollment picked this particular outcome. This default behavior appears to result from participant inertia and from employee perceptions of the default as investment advice. These findings have implications for the design of 401(k) savings plans as well as for any type of Social Security reform that includes personal accounts over which individuals have control. They also shed light more generally on the importance of both economic and noneconomic (behavioral) factors in the determination of individual savings behavior.
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