Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fox, Jeremy T.; Yang, Chenyu; Hsu, David H.
• 署名单位: Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Rochester; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/697740
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1339-1373
• 关键词: RANDOM-COEFFICIENTS; nonparametric identification; MODEL ESTIMATION; HEDONIC MODELS; choice models; outcomes; determinants; equilibrium; selection

摘要

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider manyto-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of matchspecific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.