Relational contracts and the theory of the firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baker, G; Gibbons, R; Murphy, KJ
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/003355302753399445
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 39-84
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; supplier relations; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; joint ventures; NETWORK FORMS; MARKET; COSTS; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Relational contracts-informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships-are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms.