A theory of insidious regionalism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McLaren, J
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/003355302753650337
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 571-608
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; Customs unions; free-trade; COMPETITION; gains

摘要

This paper presents an interpretation of rising regionalism in world trade as a coordination failure, based on (i) sector-specific sunk costs in production, and (ii) friction in trade negotiation. Given these elements, if a regional trade bloc is expected to form, private agents will make investments that will make bloc member countries more specialized toward each other, but bloc and nonbloc countries mutually less specialized. This diminishes the ex post demand for multilateral free trade. Thus, the expected supply of regionalism generates its own demand, creating a Pareto-inferior equilibrium.