Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Malherbe, Frederic
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/695477
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 107-149
• 关键词: Condorcet Jury Theorem; information aggregation; divided majority; SECURITY COUNCIL; UNITED-NATIONS; Decision rules; ELECTIONS; deliberation; VERDICTS; ORGANIZATIONS

摘要

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.