Influencing Connected Legislators

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battaglini, Marco; Patacchini, Eleonora
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/700074
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2277-2322
• 关键词: Campaign contributions; Network analysis; SMALL WORLD; house; money; Supermajorities; preferences; POLITICS; friends; IMPACT

摘要

This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups' moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators' preferences, and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators' Katz-Bonacich centralities. Using data on the 109th-113th Congresses and on congressmen's alumni connections, we estimate the model and find evidence supporting its predictions.