Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Avis, Eric; Ferraz, Claudio; Finan, Frederico
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; IZA Institute Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/699209
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1912-1964
• 关键词: Electoral accountability; term limits; POLICY; ELECTIONS; curse

摘要

This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil's anticorruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Our results suggest that the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived nonelectoral costs of engaging in corruption.