Opportunistic political cycles: Test in a young democracy setting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akhmedov, A; Zhuravskaya, E
• 署名单位: Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/0033553042476206
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1301-1338
• 关键词: business cycles; ELECTIONS

摘要

This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy Russia-finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence. Using regional monthly panel data, we find that (1) the budget cycle is sizable and short-lived; public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters; (2) the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy, government transparency, media freedom, voter awareness, and over time; and (3) preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents' chances for reelection. The short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies.