Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dur, Umut Mert; Unver, M. Utku
• 署名单位: North Carolina State University; Boston College; Deakin University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/701358
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1156-1177
• 关键词: House allocation; MARKET; manipulation; mechanisms

摘要

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchanges, in which export-import balances are required for longevity of programs. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve this goal. We introduce the two-sided top trading cycles, the unique mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, individually rational, and respecting priority bylaws regarding worker eligibility. Moreover, it encourages exchange, because full participation induces a dominant-strategy equilibrium for firms. We extend it to dynamic settings permitting tolerable yearly imbalances and demonstrate that its regular and tolerable versions perform considerably better than models of current practice.