Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chassang, Sylvain; Ortner, Juan
• 署名单位: New York University; Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/701812
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2269-2300
• 关键词: tacit collusion; cartel stability; CONTRACTS; inference

摘要

We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model's predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data, where we find evidence that minimum prices weakened collusion. A robust design insight is that setting a minimum price at the bottom of the observed winning-bid distribution necessarily improves over a minimum price of zero.