Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galichon, Alfred; Kominers, Scott Duke; Weber, Simon
• 署名单位: New York University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of York - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/702020
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2875-2925
• 关键词: marriage; identification; investments; STABILITY; MARKETS; models; CHOICE

摘要

We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases fully and nontransferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. We then show that the associated log likelihood has a simple expression and compute its derivatives. An empirical illustration is provided in the appendix.