A Network Approach to Public Goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Elliott, Matthew; Golub, Benjamin
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/701032
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 730-776
• 关键词: private provision; centrality; matrices; Allocations; equilibrium; ECONOMY; core

摘要

Suppose that agents can exert costly effort that creates nonrival, heterogeneous benefits for each other. At each possible outcome, a weighted, directed network describing marginal externalities is defined. We show that Pareto efficient outcomes are those at which the largest eigenvalue of the network is 1. An important set of efficient solutions-Lindahl outcomes-are characterized by contributions being proportional to agents' eigenvector centralities in the network. The outcomes we focus on are motivated by negotiations. We apply the results to identify who is essential for Pareto improvements, how to efficiently subdivide negotiations, and whom to optimally add to a team.