Speeding, terrorism, and teaching to the test
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lazear, Edward P.
署名单位：
Stanford University; Stanford University
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.1162/qjec.121.3.1029
发表日期：
2006
页码：
1029-1061
关键词：
摘要：
Educators worry that high-stakes testing will induce teachers and their students to focus only on the test and ignore other, untested aspects of knowledge. Some counter that although this may be true, knowing something is better than knowing nothing and many students would benefit even by learning the material that is to be tested. Using the metaphor of deterring drivers from speeding, it is shown that the optimal rules for high-stakes testing depend on the costs of learning and of monitoring. Incentives need to be concentrated for those whose costs of action are high. For high cost learners this implies announcing the exact requirements of the test. For more able students, a more amorphous standard produces superior results. This is analogous to announcing where the police are when the detection costs are high. Other applications are discussed.
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