Muddled Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/701604
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1739-1776
• 关键词: private information; signals; MODEL

摘要

We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase-due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology-more information is revealed about gaming ability, and less about natural actions. We explore a new externality: showing agents' actions to additional observers can worsen information for existing observers. Applications to credit scoring, school testing, and web searching are discussed.