A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clementi, GL; Hopenhayn, HA
• 署名单位: New York University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2006.121.1.229
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 229-265
• 关键词: Moral hazard; cash flow; GROWTH; entry; size; EXIT; INVESTMENT; survival

摘要

There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival. In this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing/lending relationship with asymmetric information. We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower's claim to future cash flows increases. We also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics. In agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and variance of growth decrease, and firm survival increases.