Pay, reference points, and police performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mas, Alexandre
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.121.3.783
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 783-821
• 关键词: models

摘要

Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.