Electoral bias and policy choice: Theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Preston, Ian
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1473
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1473-1510
• 关键词: congressional elections; stochastic-model; 2-PARTY SYSTEMS; COMPETITION; REPRESENTATION; CONVERGENCE; DEMOCRACY; STATES

摘要

This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.