Optimal taxation with endogenous insurance markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.122.2.487
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 487-534
• 关键词: repeated moral hazard; competitive equilibria; consumption; COMMITMENT; access; income; RISK

摘要

We study optimal taxation in an economy where the skills of agents evolve stochastically over time and are private information and in which agents can trade unobservably in competitive markets. We show that competitive equilibria are constrained inefficient. The government can improve welfare by distorting capital accumulation with the sign of the distortion depending on the nature of the skill process. Finally, we show that private insurance provision responds endogenously to policy, that government insurance tends to crowd out private insurance, and, in a calibrated example, that this crowding out effect is large.