Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts, and the pattern of trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nunn, Nathan
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.122.2.569
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 569-600
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; industry; COSTS

摘要

Is a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, 1 find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.