Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/702173
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2967-3017
• 关键词: INTERDEPENDENT VALUATIONS; vertical integration; mechanism design; auctions; incentives; surplus; prices

摘要

We analyze the competitive effects of mergers in markets with buyer power. Using mechanism design arguments, we show that without cost synergies, mergers harm buyers, regardless of buyer power. However, buyer power mitigates the harm to a buyer from a merger of symmetric suppliers. With buyer power, a merger increases incentives for entry, increases investment incentives for rivals, and can increase investment incentives for merging parties. Because buyer power reduces the profitability of a merger, it increases the profitability of perfect collusion relative to a merger. Cost synergies can eliminate merger harm but also render otherwise profitable mergers unprofitable.