Socially optimal districting: A theoretical and empirical exploration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coate, Stephen; Knight, Brian
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Brown University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1409
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1409-1471
• 关键词: partisan bias; POLICY; REPRESENTATION; MODEL; GERRYMANDER; DEMOCRACY; POLITICS; systems; finance; COSTS

摘要

This paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections. In the model, districting. matters because it determines the seat-vote curve, which describes the relationship between seats and votes. The paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve and shows that, under a weak condition, there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship. The paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat-vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting. This is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect U.S. state legislators during the 1990s.