Optimal Monetary Policy with Informational Frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Angeletos, George-Marios; La'O, Jennifer
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/704758
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1027-1064
• 关键词: social value; endogenous information; sticky prices; fiscal-policy; expectations; forecasts; RIGIDITY; taxation; news

摘要

We study optimal policy in a business-cycle setting in which firms hold dispersed private information about, or are rationally inattentive to, the state of the economy. The informational friction is the source of both nominal and real rigidity. Because of the latter, the optimal monetary policy does not target price stability. Instead, it targets a negative relation between the nominal price level and real economic activity. Such leaning against the wind helps maximize production efficiency. An additional contribution is the adaptation of the primal approach of the Ramsey literature to a flexible form of informational friction.