Collusion in Markets with Syndication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Lowery, Richard; Barry, Jordan M.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/709953
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3779-3819
• 关键词: price; capacity; MODEL; ipos

摘要

Many markets are syndicated, including those for initial public offerings, club deal leveraged buyouts, and debt issuances; in such markets, each winning bidder invites competitors to join a syndicate to complete production. We show that in syndicated markets, collusion may become easier as market concentration falls and market entry may facilitate collusion. In particular, firms can sustain collusion by refusing to syndicate with any firm that undercuts the collusive price, thereby raising that firm's production costs. Our results can thus rationalize the paradoxical empirical observations that many real-world syndicated markets exhibit seemingly collusive pricing despite low levels of market concentration.