THE VULNERABILITY OF AUCTIONS TO BIDDER COLLUSION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marshall, Robert C.; Marx, Leslie M.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Duke University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.883
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 883-910
• 关键词: Vickrey auctions; tacit collusion; price auctions; 2nd-price

摘要

Previous work has addressed the relative vulnerability of different auction schemes to collusive bidding. The common wisdom is that ascending-bid and second-price auctions are highly susceptible to collusion. We show that the details of ascending-bid and second-price auctions, including bidder registration procedures and procedures for information revelation during the auction, can be designed to completely inhibit, or unintentionally facilitate, certain types of collusion. If auctions are designed without acknowledging the possibility of collusion then the design will ignore key features that impact the potential success of colluding bidders.