On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de la Sierra, Raul Sanchez
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/703989
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 32-74
• 关键词: CONFLICT

摘要

A positive demand shock for coltan, a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed, leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines, where they settle as stationary bandits. A similar shock for gold, easy to conceal, leads to stationary bandits in the villages where income from gold is spent, where they introduce illicit mining visas, taxes, and administrations. Having a stationary bandit from a militia or the Congolese army increases welfare. These findings suggest that armed actors may create essential functions of a state to better expropriate, which, depending on their goals, can increase welfare.