Segmentation versus Agglomeration: Competition between Platforms with Competitive Sellers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karle, Heiko; Peitz, Martin; Reisinger, Markus
• 署名单位: Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/705720
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2329-2374
• 关键词: consumer search; monopolistic competition; exclusive contracts; internet; CHOICE; MARKET; entry; price

摘要

For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in platform industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to sustain high fees and explains why, for example, in some online markets, several homogeneous platforms segment the market. Instead, if product market competition is soft, agglomeration on a single platform emerges, and platforms fight for the dominant position. These insights give rise to novel predictions. For instance, market concentration and fees are negatively correlated in platform industries, which inverts the standard logic of competition.