GAMING PERFORMANCE FEES BY PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; University of Oxford; Brookings Institution
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1435
发表日期：
2010
页码：
1435-1458
关键词：
摘要：
We show that it is very difficult to devise performance-based compensation contracts that reward portfolio managers who generate excess returns while screening out managers who cannot generate such returns. Theoretical bounds are derived on the amount of fee manipulation that is possible under various performance contracts. We show that recent proposals to reform compensation practices, such as postponing bonuses and instituting clawback provisions, will not eliminate opportunities to game the system unless accompanied by transparency in managers' positions and strategies. Indeed, there exists no compensation mechanism that separates skilled from unskilled managers solely on the basis of their returns histories.
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