On the Direction of Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bryan, Kevin A.; Lemus, Jorge
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/714093
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1991-2022
• 关键词: research-and-development; PATENT PROTECTION; COMPETITION; GROWTH; patentability; spillovers; ECONOMICS; search; RIGHTS; FIRMS

摘要

How are resources allocated across different R&D areas (i.e., problems to be solved)? As a result of dynamic congestion externalities, the competitive market allocates excessive resources into those of high return, being those with higher private (and social) payoffs. Good problems are tackled too soon, and as a result the distribution of open research problems in the socially optimal solution stochastically dominates that of the competitive equilibrium. A severe form of rent dissipation occurs in the latter, where the total value of R&D activity equals the value of allocating all resources to the least valuable problem solved. Resulting losses can be substantial.