Understanding Disparities in Punishment: Regulator Preferences and Expertise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kang, Karam; Silveira, Bernardo S.
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/715415
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2947-2992
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; structural estimation; ENFORCEMENT; pollution; performance; emissions; demand; crime; COSTS; EPAS

摘要

This paper quantifies the benefits of discretion in the enforcement of environmental regulations. We identify and estimate a structural model of regulator-discharger interactions, exploiting an increase in the enforcement stringency of water pollution regulations in California. Our estimates indicate that most of the heterogeneity in punishments for observably similar violations is due to heterogeneity in discharger compliance costs rather than heterogeneity in regulator preferences. We find that removing the discretion of regulators to tailor punishments to discharger attributes would raise enforcement costs and decrease compliance by dischargers with high social harms of violations.