Do Environmental Markets Improve on Open Access? Evidence from California Groundwater Rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ayres, Andrew B.; Meng, Kyle C.; Plantinga, Andrew J.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/715075
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2817-2860
• 关键词: regression discontinuity designs; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; CATCH SHARES; UNSETTLED PROBLEMS; POLLUTION-CONTROL; CLIMATE-CHANGE; irrigation; management; inference; LAND

摘要

Environmental markets are widely prescribed as an alternative to open access regimes for natural resources. We develop a model of dynamic groundwater extraction to demonstrate how a spatial regression discontinuity design that exploits a spatially incomplete market for groundwater rights recovers a lower bound on the market's net benefit. We apply this estimator to a major aquifer in water-scarce southern California and find that a groundwater market generated substantial net benefits, as capitalized in land values. Heterogeneity analyses point to gains arising in part from rights trading, enabling more efficient water use across sectors. Additional findings suggest that the market increased groundwater levels.