Multiproduct Intermediaries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rhodes, Andrew; Watanabe, Makoto; Zhou, Jidong
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/711917
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 421-464
• 关键词: pass-through; search; equilibrium; middlemen; retail; MARKET

摘要

This paper develops a new framework for studying multiproduct intermediaries when consumers demand multiple products and face search frictions. We show that a multiproduct intermediary is profitable even when it does not improve consumer search efficiency. The intermediary optimally stocks high-value products exclusively to attract consumers to visit and then profits by selling nonexclusive products that are relatively cheap to buy from upstream suppliers. Relative to the social optimum, the intermediary tends to be too big and stock too many products exclusively. We use the framework to study the design of shopping malls and the impact of direct-to-consumer sales by upstream suppliers on the retail market.