How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel; Imbert, Clement; Spinnewijn, Johannes; Tsankova, Teodora; Luts, Maarten
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/713096
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1425-1463
• 关键词: take-up; field; ENFORCEMENT; evasion; audit

摘要

We study the impact of simplification, deterrence, and tax morale on tax compliance. We ran four natural field experiments varying the communication of the tax administration with the universe of income taxpayers in Belgium throughout the tax process. A consistent picture emerges across experiments: (i) simplifying communication substantially increases compliance, (ii) deterrence messages have an additional positive effect, (iii) invoking tax morale is not effective and often backfires. A discontinuity in enforcement intensity, combined with the experimental variation, allows us to compare simplification with standard enforcement measures. We find that simplification is far more cost-effective, allowing for substantial savings on enforcement costs.