A POLITICAL THEORY OF POPULISM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Northwestern University; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjs077
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 771-805
• 关键词: electoral competition; MODEL; persistence; INFORMATION; PARTIES

摘要

When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses populist policies-that is, policies to the left of the median voter-as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies. JEL Codes: D71, D74.