Securing Property Rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Behrer, A. Patrick; Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.; Shleifer, Andrei
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/712733
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1157-1192
• 关键词: liability rules; CONTRACTS; ENFORCEMENT; INVESTMENT; city; view

摘要

A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.