REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION IN THE ROY MODEL

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rothschild, Casey; Scheuer, Florian
• 署名单位: Wellesley College; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjs076
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 623-668
• 关键词: Optimal income taxation; self-selection; tax; LABOR; equilibrium; education; rates

摘要

We consider,optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self-select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector. We first show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens, the constrained Pareto frontier can be implemented with a single nonlinear income tax. We then characterize this optimal tax schedule. If sectoral inputs are complements, a many-sector model with self-selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single-sector model under natural conditions. However, they are more progressive than in canonical multisector economies with discrete types and without occupational choice or overlapping sectoral wage distributions. JEL Codes: H2, D5, D8, E2, E6, J3, J6.