Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jones, Charles I.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/720394
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2227-2274
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; redistributive taxation; basic research; GROWTH; elasticities; spillovers; EARNERS; POLICY; taxes; MODEL

摘要

This paper considers top income taxation when (i) new ideas drive economic growth, (ii) the reward for successful innovation is a top income, and (iii) innovation cannot be perfectly targeted by a research subsidy-think about the business methods of Walmart, the creation of Uber, or the idea of Amazon. These conditions lead to a new force affecting the optimal top tax rate: by slowing the creation of new ideas that drive aggregate GDP, top income taxation reduces everyone's income, not just income at the top. This force sharply constrains both revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing top tax rates.