Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grenet, Julien; He, YingHua; Kubler, Dorothea
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Rice University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Technical University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/718983
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1427-1476
• 关键词: School choice; information acquisition; MARKET; search; INVESTMENT; assignment; physicians; DESIGN

摘要

We document quasi-experimental evidence against the common assumption in the matching literature that agents have full information on their own preferences. In Germany's university admissions, the first stages of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are implemented in real time, allowing for multiple offers per student. We demonstrate that nonexploding early offers are accepted more often than later offers, despite not being more desirable. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoretical model, are consistent with students' costly discovery of preferences. A novel dynamic multioffer mechanism that batches early offers improves matching efficiency by informing students of offer availability before preference discovery.