Last-Place Aversion: Evidence and Redistributive Implications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuziemko, Ilyana; Buell, Ryan W.; Reich, Taly; Norton, Michael I.
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Harvard University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjt035
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 105-149
• 关键词: risk-aversion; UNITED-STATES; preferences; INEQUALITY; utility; COMPETITION; income; rank; EFFICIENCY; fairness

摘要

We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are last-place averse. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict. JEL Codes: H23, D31, C91.