Vertical Contracts with Endogenous Product Selection: An Empirical Analysis of Vendor Allowance Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hristakeva, Sylvia
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/720631
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 3202-3252
• 关键词: 3rd-degree price-discrimination; slotting allowances; retailers; MARKET; manufacturers; maintenance; ASSORTMENT; inference; variety

摘要

Producers frequently provide retailers with financial incentives to secure product distribution. These payments often take the form of vendor allowances: lump-sum transfers to retailers that do not directly depend on quantity sold. I introduce an estimation strategy that uses observed product selections to inform unobserved allowances. I use retailers' replacement threats, which may allow them to capture both vendor transfers and lower wholesale prices. A counterfactual restricts firms to contract on only wholesale prices. Results show that vendor allowances may have not only (negative) product distortion effects but also (potentially positive) pricing effects.