Cooperative Property Rights and Development: Evidence from Land Reform in El Salvador

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Montero, Eduardo
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/717042
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 48-93
• 关键词: regression discontinuity design; moral hazard; incentives; RISK; CONTRACTS; COSTS; PRODUCTIVITY; agriculture; performance; allocation

摘要

In cooperative property rights systems, workers jointly own and manage production, whereas in outside-ownership systems, an owner contracts workers. Despite a rich literature on how the allocation of property rights matters for specialization, efficiency, and equity, little causal evidence exists. During a land reform in El Salvador in 1980, the military government reorganized properties owned by individuals with cumulative landholdings over 500 hectares into cooperatives; properties below this threshold remained as outside-owned properties. Using the discontinuous probability of cooperative formation, I provide evidence on the effects of cooperative property rights relative to outside ownership on specialization, productivity, and worker equity.